

Security Intelligence
Review Committee



Comité de surveillance des activités
de renseignement de sécurité

Office of the Chairman

Bureau du président

TOP SECRET // CEO

File no.: 2800-224

January 17, 2018

The Honourable Ralph Goodale, P.C.
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
269 Laurier Avenue West
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0P8

Dear Mr. Goodale,

RE: Review of a Foreign Station:

(SIRC Study 2017-05)

Every year SIRC travels to foreign stations to undertake an in-depth examination of CSIS's work overseas in order to better appreciate the nature, scope and complexity of its activities abroad. This year, SIRC visited two stations which have cooperated on a number of files and share similar collection requirements. **Annex A** provides background information.

During SIRC's on-site visit in September 2017, the Executive Director and two Research staff met with CSIS personnel in order to address a wide array of issues, as well as gain a better understanding of the working environment at Station.

SIRC found that CSIS's activities, conducted between January 1, 2015, and January 31, 2017, out of both foreign stations, complied with the *CSIS Act*, and Ministerial direction, as well as being in line with CSIS's priorities and intelligence requirements. All exchanges with foreign partners fell within the scope of the s. 17 arrangements that were in place. SIRC did find, however, instances of non-compliance with internal policy which required a particular caveat to be attached to documentation when certain information is shared with CSIS's foreign partners. SIRC recommends CSIS institute a quality assurance mechanism to ensure all required caveats are included prior to sharing information with its partners.

SIRC found that the stations have maintained positive relationships with all of their partners and CSIS's presence is appreciated by its domestic partners at mission. CSIS is

able to assist with evaluating threat reporting that domestic partners receive either by providing analytical expertise or through liaison with partners.

The value of CSIS's presence in Europe was illustrated in both after each country experienced terrorist attacks. Having CSIS provided the Canadian Mission with the assurance that any intelligence regarding the incident - or future attacks - would be quickly forthcoming. It was also after attacks that CSIS's support to analyzing the security situation was not only appreciated but necessary.

This review underscored to SIRC that foreign liaison posts are important for CSIS's collection efforts, but also contribute greatly to ensuring that their domestic partners overseas are receiving what they need, including expertise and critical analysis. However, SIRC recognizes that the success of CSIS abroad relies heavily on the personalities and initiative of the individual Heads of Station.

We would be pleased to discuss the Committee's conclusions and recommendation with you.

Sincerely,



Pierre Blais, P.C.
Chair

c.c.:

David Vigneault, Director of CSIS

DG/

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Annex A

The core period under review for this study was from January 1, 2015, to January 31, 2017, but SIRC reviewed documentation that fell outside this period in order to examine relevant issues comprehensively.

SIRC met with [redacted] and other relevant Canadian officials working at the Missions – Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Department of National Defense (DND), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and representatives of Global Affairs Canada (GAC).

In addition to the on-site briefings with both Heads of Station (HoS), SIRC examined documents pertaining to the activities of [redacted] stations including: station and country profiles; s.17 foreign arrangement profiles; weekly accountability reports; all documents contained in the foreign partner files; and all information sent to s. 17 partners.

[redacted] were selected as they work closely together on a number of files

[redacted] In addition, [redacted] have experienced recent terrorist attacks and this provided SIRC an opportunity to examine CSIS's contribution in times of crisis.

CSIS has had a presence [redacted] since its inception in 1984, taking over the security intelligence liaison function from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). In addition to being responsible for partnerships [redacted] the [redacted] station is also responsible for liaising with agencies [redacted] The vast majority of liaison takes place with the [redacted] agencies, but increasingly [redacted] is becoming an important partner [redacted] is also an important partner

[redacted] was opened in 2010, having been previously located in [redacted] In addition to liaising with [redacted] is responsible for [redacted] A CSIS procedure, effective August 2015, specifies how and when to use specific caveats and assurances when sharing information with domestic and foreign partners. One of the caveats that must be included in the correspondence with foreign entities addresses compliance with international law, including the United Nations *Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment of Punishment*.¹ After reviewing over 1000 CSIS documents sent to liaison partners, SIRC found that this required caveat was not

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included in over 35 documents

Both HoS work towards enhancing awareness of counter intelligence (CI) threats.

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