

**TOP SECRET**

**File No.: 2800-170  
(TD R522)**

**CSIS ACTIVITIES RELATED TO DOMESTIC  
INVESTIGATIONS AND EMERGING THREATS**

**(SIRC STUDY 2012-02)**

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

For most of its history, CSIS has run successful, investigations into domestic threat-related activities

collection authority against a threat to the security of Canada as defined under the CSIS Act. They may target groups, organization, individuals, issues or events.

Nationally,  
CSIS is still collecting on domestic extremism in regions where such threats exist.

Overall, SIRC is in agreement with CSIS, to cover domestic threats, and with the perspective that, in general, the actual threat arises from issues or events. Although the investigations may present some challenges, SIRC believes that increased liaison with law enforcement provides assurance that CSIS will be apprised should criminal behaviour drift into the realm of threats to national security. This information can also assist the Service in its function of providing accurate reporting to Government of Canada clients.

## 2 METHODOLOGY

This review examined CSIS's activities related to their domestic investigations and emerging threats. SIRC examined corporate, operational and policy documents and reviewed operational messages and files. In addition, SIRC held briefings with CSIS Headquarters (HQ) staff and completed an on-site visit to meet with management and regional intelligence officers.

The core review period was from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2011,

### **3 DOMESTIC EXTREMISM**

CSIS characterizes domestic extremism as the willingness of individuals or groups in Canada to use violence or the threat of violence for political and/or ideological purposes. This often includes those groups or individuals who use serious violence or acts of sabotage to further their environmental, anti-capitalist, anti-globalization, and animal rights objectives.

In recent years, the high level of threat associated with all these investigations has been re-assessed.

#### **3.1 High Profile Events of 2010**

The Vancouver Olympic Games were ultimately relatively peaceful in spite of some very vocal opposition. A very strong pro-Olympic reaction to the opposition was apparent -- in fact there were even counter-protests organized.

The G-20 Summit in Toronto was not as tranquil;

Moreover, although there was a substantial amount of vandalism targeting banks and downtown Toronto businesses

### 3.2 Post Event Recalibration

With the conclusion of the Vancouver Olympics and the G8/G20 Summits,









**5 ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION**

## 5.2 The Importance of Liaison

liaison with law enforcement becomes of central importance.

Law enforcement agencies can be a source of information,

Law enforcement officials, however, may be aware of those involved in criminal activity who may at some point pose a threat according to CSIS's mandate.

SIRC saw examples of fruitful liaison with law enforcement, both in older areas where the Service no longer had investigations and with emerging issues.<sup>29</sup>

**SIRC found that liaison with law enforcement agencies is an effective use of resources. it is an appropriate means of gaining information and staying abreast of potential threats.**

## 6 REASONABLE INVESTIGATION

During the review process, SIRC examined : operational reporting to ensure that investigations were handled in an appropriate and reasonable manner -- i.e. adherence to internal policy and the CSIS mandate. SIRC also wanted to ensure that the Service stopped investigating those many targets who had been terminated after the 2010 events.

**SIRC found that activities related to legitimate protest and dissent were not investigated and that detailed operational reporting on former targets ceased.**

Although there was no indication that CSIS was investigating those who were involved in legitimate activities, there was an instance where operational reporting was distorted to indicate a person was advocating the use of extreme violence to further a cause.

advocated assault and murder.

SIRC believes this does not indicate a general misunderstanding at CSIS of  
but rather a case of careless reporting. SIRC was pleased to see that after its  
request for any other information the Service may have in their possession to indicate the  
support of the entry was amended in operational reporting

## 7 CONCLUSION

Overall, SIRC agrees with the direction that CSIS is taking with regards to domestic extremism.

**SIRC found that CSIS moved quickly to terminate investigation of those individuals who were no longer considered threats after the major events of 2010 and would encourage the Service to be as vigilant regarding future events or issues.**

The Government's need for information on threats that are mainly dormant until an event or an issue arises,

CSIS must ensure that by maintaining a presence that they do not intrude on legitimate forms of protest and dissent,

the Service is taking SIRC encourages the direction liaising with their domestic partners.

These relationships ultimately help provide information and help CSIS advise its Government clients when the time arises.