Annual Report 2002-2003

An Operational Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Security Intelligence Review Committee
P. O. Box 2430, Station “D”
Ottawa ON
K1P 5W5

Tel: (613) 990-8441
Fax: (613) 990-5230
Web Site: http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca
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© Public Works and Government Services Canada 2003
Cat. No. JS71-1/ 2003
ISBN 0-662-67626-2

September 30, 2003

The Honourable Wayne Easter, P. C., M. P.
Solicitor General of Canada
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Dear Mr. Easter:

As required by section 53 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, we transmit to you the Report of the Security Intelligence Review Committee for the fiscal year 2002-2003, for your submission to Parliament.

Yours sincerely,

Statement from the Committee

Canada's security intelligence and public security apparatus continues to absorb the repercussions of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For the security intelligence community generally, and for the Review Committee in particular, some of the most important of these are only now being fully realized.

SIRC's Annual Report for 2002-2003 encompasses the first year in which significant new laws, the Anti-terrorism Act among others, were in force. It was also the first complete fiscal year in which Canadian citizens fully felt in their lives measures announced in the Government's public safety and security initiative of December 2001. These measures have affected everything from passing through an airport or working in one, to applying for a passport and holding a job in a nuclear power facility. Dramatic political and military events abroad - some involving serious risk to the lives of Canadian citizens and to Canada's soldiers overseas - could not help but have consequences within our borders.

In this dynamic domestic and international environment, the Review Committee must reconcile two distinct imperatives. Parliament has every right to expect, and simple professional prudence requires, that the Committee understands as best it can the changes at work and the impact they are having or may have on CSIS's activities. To this end, the Members of the Committee devote considerable effort.

At the same time, however, the Committee is convinced that continuity of principle and of practice is central to our task. Adherence to the law, sober judgement and serious inquiry - irrespective of the political and social undercurrents of the moment - are the Committee's main assets in fulfilling its core function: ensuring Parliament, and through it the people of Canada, that in conducting its security intelligence activities CSIS acts within the law and does not undermine the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

The period encompassed in this, the Committee's 19th Annual Report, was the first complete fiscal year in which CSIS had at its disposal the 30-percent increase in funding given to it by the Government following September 11. Although the Service was given no new legal authorities, the tempo of activity in many operational areas has risen - in some cases significantly.

CSIS reorganized its operational structure and began to deploy resources in novel ways. For example, Service personnel and resources are devoted both to new government efforts to coordinate its anti-terrorist and public safety programs such as the public - private CBRN Research and Technology Initiative that addresses threats from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, and to the RCMP's regionally based Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs).

Almost all this heightened level of activity can be attributed to the Government's concern to meet evident threats to the safety of its citizens, to Canada's national security and to that of its allies. However, with higher levels of activity there is an inescapable reality - as the Service's investigations become more numerous and complex, there is more for the Committee to review.

In the spring of 2002, we undertook to assess the implications of the rise in CSIS activities for SIRC's own operations. We asked for and received two classified briefings from the Service about how it intended to use the additional funds. Accordingly, in July 2002 SIRC made a formal request to Treasury Board for an increase in budget of 16 percent. If granted, this increment would provide the Committee with the financial resources commensurate with CSIS's expanded activities so that we might continue to fulfill our obligations to Parliament.

An additional challenge the Committee faces is that the Service is stepping up its co-operation and information exchanges both with old partners in new ways and with entirely new entities. As the Service moves into new and unfamiliar territory, so must the Committee. An example of the potential challenges to be found in such relationships are the RCMP-led INSETs created in 2002, and the reciprocal secondments of officers initiated between CSIS and the RCMP. Under this structure - one that replaces the long-standing mutual exchange of “liaison officers” - investigative personnel from each agency will work within the chain of command of the host body.

The Committee has some misgivings about the impact of this new structure on our ability to determine whether the Service and its employees have acted in compliance with current law and policy. As the Service expands its operational relationships with organizations not subject to the Committee's review, the Committee will remain alert to the compliance issues this and other such novel arrangements might raise.

One prediction the Committee made based on an analysis of the post-September 11 changes in legislation - notably the Anti-terrorism Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the Charities Registration Act - has not been borne out. In recent SIRC Annual Reports, and in representations to Parliament, the Committee forecast that complaints about CSIS would increase discernibly, especially in areas of security screening and charities. However, the anticipated rise in the number of complaints has not occurred.

No doubt one factor at work is the relative caution with which the Government has implemented the new legal and administrative measures. There has been no significant increase in the number of arrests or detentions on terrorism or immigration-related charges. The “listing” of terrorist entities has proceeded largely without controversy. And to date, no charities have been denied status or had it withdrawn because of ties to known terrorist organizations.

Findings in two of the Committee's in-depth reviews summarized in this report tend to support this observation. In its investigation of certain potentially violent domestic threats the Service took care not to impede legitimate political activity. In its investigations of Islamic extremist terrorism in Canada, the Service restricted its activities to the threats posed by persons and organizations disposed to employ violence and did not investigate the Islamic community as a whole. The broadly positive findings of these two reviews notwithstanding, the Committee will continue to pay its closest attention to any Service investigation that holds the potential to damage civil liberties or to impact negatively on fundamental social institutions such as religious organizations, universities, the media and trade unions.

It is this latter task which the Committee sees as its chief function. For CSIS to be effective in advising government about threats to the security of Canada and its citizens, Parliament and the people of Canada must have confidence that it is acting within the law. The Review Committee is the essential component in ensuring that vital democratic accountability. Within the boundaries set by law on the public discussion of security intelligence issues, the Members of the Review Committee undertake, as always, to be as open and transparent with Parliament and the public as we are able.

Table of Contents

• Statement from the Committee
• How SIRC's Report is Organized
• Section 1 : SIRC Review and Complaints Functions
  1. Reviews of CSIS Security Intelligence Activities
     • How SIRC Carries Out its Review Function - An Overview
     • In the Matter of Ahmed Ressam
     • Sunni Islamic Extremism - A Review of CSIS Regional Investigations
  2. Investigations of Complaints
     • Reports of Decisions - Case Histories
       • Section 41 - “Any act or thing”
       • Section 42 - Denial of Security Clearance
  3. Section 54 Report to the Solicitor General Respecting Allegations of CSIS Misconduct
• Section 2 : CSIS Accountability Mechanisms
  1. Policy And Governance Framework
     • 2002-2003 National Requirements for Security Intelligence
     • Ministerial Direction
     • Governor in Council Regulations and Appointments
     • Section 28 Regulations
     • Changes in CSIS Operational Policy
  2. Reporting Requirements
     • Certificate of the Inspector General for 2002
     • CSIS Annual Operational Report for 2001-2002
     • Unlawful Conduct
     • Section 2(d) Investigations
     • Disclosures of Information in the Public or National Interest
  3. CSIS Operational Activities
     • Counter Proliferation
     • Counter Terrorism
     • Counter Intelligence
     • Research, Analysis and Production
     • Security Screening
     • CSIS Domestic and International Arrangements
     • Federal Court Warrants and Warrant Statistics
• Section 3 : Inside The Security Intelligence Review Committee
  • Appointment of a New Member
  • Senior Staff Appointments at SIRC
  • SIRC Staffing and Organization
  • Research and Review Activities
  • Security Intelligence Briefings
  • Parliamentary Relations
  • Additional Committee Activities
  • Budget and Expenditures
  • SIRC Request for Increased Funding
  • Inquiries Under the Access to Information and Privacy Acts
• Appendices
  1. Acronyms
  2. SIRC Reports and Studies Since 1984
  3. Key Findings and Recommendations

How SIRC's Report is Organized

Section 1 : SIRC Review and Complaints Functions

A. Reviews of CSIS Security Intelligence Activities

How SIRC Carries Out Its Review Function - An Overview

The Committee's Role in CSIS's Accountability Structure

A significant component of SIRC's review activity takes the form of research projects carried out by staff, directed by Committee Members. As a matter of policy, and in accordance with the Committee's role in the Service's governance and accountability structure, the Committee reviews CSIS's performance of its duties and functions retrospectively to assure itself—and, by extension, Parliament and the people of Canada—that the Service has acted appropriately and within the law.

The Service continues at all times to be accountable for current operations through the existing apparatus of government, specifically the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Inspector General of CSIS. With respect to its financial administration, CSIS, like almost all federal bodies, is responsible to government through a Minister of the Crown (in the Service's case, the Solicitor General), the central agencies of government and directly to Parliament through the Office of the Auditor General of Canada.

The Focus of SIRC Studies-Choices and Responsibilities

The Committee's review function is essentially one of risk management. It decides which areas of the Service's extensive operational activities warrant the most careful monitoring. The content of any individual study and its findings arise from examining the relevant documents and interviewing individuals who are pertinent to that study. The findings of any single review are not to be read as a judgment on the Service's operations as a whole.

SIRC research projects for any given year are designed to yield assessments across the range of CSIS's operational activities. This approach helps ensure that, over time, the Committee comes to understand comprehensively the Service's activities and is thus able to either assure Parliament that the Service has acted appropriately, or to inform Parliament in a timely and instructive manner that it has not.

A number of factors influence which topics are selected for in-depth inquiry:

• the nature of the international threat environment;
• public undertakings by the Committee to follow up on past reviews or to launch new ones;
• issues arising from complaints brought before the Committee;
• alterations in government policy or practice with significant implications for CSIS operations; and
• SIRC's statutory obligations under section 38 of the CSIS Act.

The selection of topics for review is approved by the Committee at the beginning of each fiscal year. However, the Committee has the capacity to adjust its review plans to respond to unexpected events and has done so on several occasions.

SIRC Reviews in 2002-2003

Several of the factors listed above worked to determine which reviews were selected for 2002-2003. With our report on CSIS's investigation into Sunni Islamic extremism in two regions, the Committee fulfills a commitment made in last year's Annual Report to follow up on its foundation study of this complex area. Similarly, our review of the Ahmed Ressam matter completes a public undertaking the Committee made early in 2001 to look into the case at a later date.

The Committee's report on certain domestic threats reflects our continued special interest in any Service operation that has the potential to impact upon lawful advocacy, protest and dissent. Finally, examinations of several CSIS arrangements with foreign intelligence services, and our study of the Service's role in collecting foreign intelligence in Canada, both speak to another essential element in the Committee's strategy-the regular monitoring of the Service's important operational activities and the execution of our obligations under section 38 of the Act.

Readers will also note that three of the five reports deal with matters of terrorism or politically motivated violence. As we have noted in previous Annual Reports, the Service's chief preoccupation since the mid-1990s has been with threats to public safety posed by terrorism and other forms of serious violence. As CSIS devotes an ever-growing share of its investigative resources to dealing with such threats, the Committee has adjusted its own focus accordingly.

In the Matter of Ahmed Ressam - Report # 2002-03

Background

On December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested while attempting to enter the United States from Canada with explosives hidden in the trunk of his rental car. Ressam was subsequently convicted on charges related to his unsuccessful attempt to carry out a terrorist attack at the Los Angeles International Airport to mark the beginning of the new millennium. Ressam's case attracted intense media coverage and contributed to a perception that Canada was a “safe haven” for terrorists to plan and undertake attacks against the United States.

Following these events, the Review Committee made a public commitment to examine the actions of the Service in respect of Ahmed Ressam at a future date. This report summarizes the Committee's findings and conclusions in the matter.

Methodology of the Review

The objective of the review was to examine CSIS's investigation of the threat posed by Ressam within the context of Sunni Islamic extremism. As in all Committee reviews, our goal was to ensure that the Service's activities complied with the law, ministerial direction and operational policy.

The review covered the period from Ressam's arrival in Canada in February 1994 through March 31, 2001 and included all relevant Service documents and files (electronic and hard-copy). To complete its inquiries, the Committee examined, as necessary, additional material falling outside this period.

The Committee hoped to answer five key questions:

1. What was the nature and the extent of the Service's knowledge of Ressam prior to his arrest?
2. What was the substance of the Service's co-operation and exchange of information with domestic and foreign agencies regarding Ressam?
3. How did the Service's operational interest in Ressam change following his arrest?
4. What was the substance and value of the information CSIS received from United States authorities arising from Ressam's agreement to co-operate with American authorities?
5. Did the Ressam matter prompt any changes in CSIS policy or operational practice?

Findings of the Committee

CSIS's Knowledge of Ressam Prior to his Arrest

Ahmed Ressam first came to the Service's attention as a result of his contacts with persons suspected of engaging in threat-related activities. During this period CSIS did not regard Ressam's activities in themselves as a threat to the security of Canada. In 1998 the Service learned that Ressam had departed Canada to attend a paramilitary training camp in Afghanistan.

Prior to his departure in 1998, Ressam successfully exploited weaknesses in the Canadian passport application process (since altered), enabling him to obtain a genuine Canadian passport bearing the pseudonym “Benni Antoine Norris”. Returning to Canada in February 1999 using this passport, Ressam's re-entry went undetected at the time by Canadian authorities. Sometime later, the Service received unsubstantiated information that Ressam had returned to Canada. However, his whereabouts and activities remained unknown to the Service until his arrest by U. S. authorities on December 14, 1999.

Upon reviewing all the relevant documentation, the Committee concluded that the Service did not possess specific information that would have forewarned it of Ressam's planned terrorist operations. In the Committee's view, the actions CSIS took to locate Ressam in 1999 were appropriate in light of the information available at the time. The Committee saw no evidence that it was a lack of vigilance on the part of the Service that contributed to Ressam's ability to escape detection after his return in 1999.

CSIS Activities Post-Arrest

In late 1999 the Service and its partner agencies, both domestic and foreign, were in a heightened state of alert, working actively to identify and disrupt terrorist operations possibly being planned for the turn of the millennium. These efforts became both more intense and more focused after Ressam's arrest in December.

The Committee found that the Service's investigative activities following Ressam's arrest were appropriate and proportionate to the threat. The Service complied with the requirements of law, ministerial direction and policy. All the information collected was strictly necessary to its investigation of an imminent threat to the security of Canada.

All information exchanges between the Service and the RCMP on the Ressam matter were appropriate and, in general, both timely and thorough. This case showed the capacity of the Service and the RCMP to assist each other effectively while working within their respective mandates. Similarly, the exchanges of information between the Service and its U.S. partners were timely and comprehensive, indicating a smooth-functioning and productive relationship.

Intelligence Gathered from Ressam Post-arrest

Shortly after his conviction in April 2001, Ressam signed an agreement to co-operate with U. S. authorities in exchange for a reduction of his sentence to a minimum of 27 years' imprisonment. Ressam agreed to participate in detailed debriefings by intelligence officers and to provide testimony in future terrorism-related criminal proceedings. The Service briefed the Committee on the information provided by Ressam and on its utility.

The Service also briefed the Committee on the lessons it drew from the Ressam case-lessons that, for reasons of national security, cannot be discussed in detail here. Although CSIS did not believe changes to operational policy were necessary, these events have influenced the Service's methods respecting an overall approach to the Sunni Islamic extremist threat.

Sunni Islamic Extremism - A Review of CSIS Regional Investigations - Report #2002-05

Background

Following the events of September 11, 2001 the Review Committee launched a broad-based study into CSIS's investigation prior to the terrorist attacks of the Al Qaida organization and Sunni Islamic extremism generally. Our findings were presented in last year's Annual Report to Parliament.

As the Committee stated at the time, the goal of the study was to lay the foundation for additional focused reviews of specific elements of the Service's long-standing investigation of Sunni Islamic extremism and its connections to terrorism. Presented here are findings from one such in-depth review.

Based on information gathered from the initial survey study, the Committee elected to examine in depth a complex set of related CSIS investigations into Sunni extremism managed from two separate CSIS regional offices during the period April 2001 through March 2002. The regions were selected because among the Service's regional offices, these two were mounting the most intense counter-terrorist investigations of the Sunni extremist threat, thus providing the Committee with the greatest range of CSIS activities to observe.

Besides providing perspective on the Service's conduct of its Sunni Islamic extremist investigation, the Committee's experience is that comprehensive examinations of CSIS regional office activities produce unique insights into how the Service employs the range of investigative tools it has at its disposal. Taken together, the actions of targeting, acquiring and inplementing warrants, conducting interviews in communities, exchanging information with law enforcement and other intelligence agencies, and handling human sources are the quintessence of counter-terrorist intelligence work.

Understanding these activities allows the Committee to assess the manner in which ministerial direction and CSIS operational policies are being implemented by those sections of CSIS employing the most powerful and intrusive instruments available to government.

Methodology of the Review

The Committee examined all electronic and hard-copy documentation during the review period related to five broad operational activities:

1. the targeting request and approval process, and the investigating of targets;
2. the acquiring and implementing of warrants;
3. the recruiting, developing and directing of human sources;
4. the conducting of interviews in the community; and
5. the exchanging of information and other forms of liaison with domestic agencies.

In addition, the Committee visited the regional offices under review and conducted on-site interviews of CSIS senior management.

As in all its reviews of CSIS investigations, the Committee weighed several essential questions in assessing the appropriateness of the Service's activities:

• Did the Service have reasonable grounds to suspect a threat to the security of Canada?
• Was the level and intrusiveness of the investigation proportionate to the seriousness and imminence of the threat?
• Did the Service collect only that information strictly necessary to fulfill its mandate to advise the Government of a threat?

Although not related directly to the Service's Sunni extremism investigation, the Committee also took the opportunity to review each regional office's internal security procedures and any associated issues.

Findings of the Committee

Targeting and Investigations

The Committee selected a sample of targets to examine in detail, a selection determined by the relatively high level of investigative activity for each. The Committee found that in all cases the Service had reasonable grounds to suspect the target's involvement in activities that constituted a threat to the security of Canada and that the levels of investigation were proportionate to the threat activities observed.

In obtaining targeting authorities and conducting the investigations, the Service met all the requirements set out in law, ministerial direction and operational policy. It collected only the information strictly necessary for the investigation.

Two instances drew the Committee's attention and required additional inquiries of the Service. In the first, the Committee reviewed documentation about an unusual event involving one of the selected targets. Upon receipt of additional information from the Service, the Committee was satisfied that no improper conduct on the part of CSIS contributed to the event, nor did any Service employee contravene operational policy.

The second instance related to an error on the part of the Service that had been rectified by CSIS as soon as it was noticed. This error involved an instance of mistaken identity. Unusual and extenuating circumstances contributed to the error and the Committee is satisfied that it was unintentional. Further, the Committee was able to confirm that the Service took the proper administrative and operational measures to correct the error as soon as it became evident. The Committee believes that the authorities subsequently invoked by the Service were appropriate.

Warrant Acquisition and Implementation

Under section 21 of the CSIS Act, only the Federal Court of Canada can grant CSIS the warrant powers required to exercise its most intrusive investigative techniques, such as telephone or mail intercepts. To obtain such powers, the Service must present an affidavit to the Court attesting to the facts that require their use.

In this section of the review the Committee examined the procedures by which Headquarters obtained warrant powers against the selected targets, as well as the procedures followed by the Regions in executing those powers. By selecting for review those warrants specifically related to the targets, the Committee hoped to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the Service's approach to the Sunni Islamic extremist investigation at a most critical time-the months immediately before and immediately following the events of September 11, 2001.

With respect to all the warrants examined in both regions and based on the information made available to the Committee for review, we found that CSIS conducted the warrant acquisition process in a thorough and objective manner and used supporting information appropriately. Affidavits were complete and balanced, and the facts and circumstances of the cases were fully, fairly and objectively expressed.

In one of the affidavits reviewed, the Committee identified two minor errors and inconsistencies. In the Committee's view, however, these did not materially affect the validity of the cases presented to the Federal Court.

In another affidavit reviewed, an instance of mistaken identity resulted in a similar error in the use of warrant powers. Once the Service investigators recognized their mistake, CSIS returned to the Federal Court with a new affidavit and the Court issued a supplemental warrant.

The Committee also found that in executing the warrant powers obtained, CSIS exercised its powers appropriately and complied with all warrant clauses and conditions. With minor exceptions, both regions strictly observed operational policies concerning the collection and retention of information obtained under the warrants. In one Region, however, the Committee identified administrative errors in the recording of information emanating from warrant powers. We drew the Service's attention to these lapses in accuracy.

Recruitment and Direction of Human Sources

The use of human sources to collect information is essential to the Service's effective investigation of threats to public safety and national security. However, the sensitivity of such operations is such that they are the subject of special ministerial direction and detailed operational policy. All requests by CSIS investigators to employ human sources, which impact or appear to impact on “sensitive” or “fundamental” institutions (generally defined as trade unions, the media, religious institutions and university and college campuses) require the approval of CSIS senior management or, in some cases, the Solicitor General.

The Committee selected for review a number of human source cases associated with the Sunni extremist investigation in the two regions. We examined all relevant files and logs, and all notifications and requests for approval related to sensitive institutions.

In all cases the Committee found that the Service had acted appropriately and within the law and had properly followed all policies and procedures relating to the recruiting and directing of human sources. In one especially sensitive area of the Service's use of human sources—one that had drawn the Committee's attention previously (see SIRC Report 2001-2002, page 8)—the Committee found that CSIS managed the relationship with the source appropriately.

The Committee did identify some minor errors and oversights in one Region's human source record keeping. Although the Committee does not believe these lapses were representative of the overall high quality of CSIS's management of the human source cases reviewed, the importance of proper documentation to human source operations generally required that we bring even these relatively minor administrative errors to the attention of the Service.

Interviews in the Community

To aid an investigation, CSIS may conduct interviews with leaders of communities or interest groups concerning threats to the security of Canada that may affect their communities. There is specific operational policy guidance for such interviews: Service employees must clearly identify themselves as such, the interviewee must be made aware that co-operation is voluntary, and the interviews must be carried out in such a way that it is clear that it is a threat that is being investigated, not the community itself.

In determining whether these interviews were conducted appropriately, the Committee examined the stated rationale for conducting the interviews, CSIS reporting on both the content of the interviews and the manner in which they were conducted, and the extent to which the interviews may have aided or impeded the Service's investigations into Sunni Islamic extremism.

The Committee's review of relevant CSIS documentation showed that it conducted its interviews in a fair and appropriate manner and with sensitivity to the interviewees' civil liberties and religious freedoms. In all the interviews reviewed, CSIS was careful to make interviewees aware that it was investigating threats posed by Sunni Islamic extremism, not investigating the Sunni community as a whole. The Committee also concluded that the interviews were of operational assistance to the Service in identifying specific threats to public safety and national security.

Liaison and Exchanges of Information with Domestic Agencies

The Committee examined all relevant information regarding liaison and co-operation between the Service and other domestic agencies that pertained to the targets under review. Included in this documentation were all logged exchanges of intelligence with other domestic agencies related to those targets. The Committee was especially concerned to determine whether co-operation was timely, effective and in conformity with law, ministerial direction and operational policy.

The Committee's examination showed that all exchanges of information, disclosures by the Service and joint operations were conducted in accordance with law and policy. The Service's efforts in both Regions to build strong and co-operative relationships with other agencies were evident to the Committee. In the months following the September 11 attacks, the benefit of these initiatives was especially important because available resources to investigate threats were stretched thin.

The Service's relations with the RCMP have been of long-standing interest to the Committee. Based on our review of the two regions in question, the Service's Sunni Islamic extremist investigations benefited from an effective working relationship between the two agencies.

Issues of Internal Security

Internal security issues are an integral part of any Committee review of a Service regional office. In assessing the adequacy of security practices and procedures, the Committee can observe how operational policies, developed centrally, are implemented in the field. In the event of security violations or more seriously, security breaches, the Committee requests a follow-up from the Service so it can determine whether these have been addressed satisfactorily. The Committee's review of internal security covers the period since our last review.

In one region, the Committee identified a number of security violations and no breaches. * The Region took remedial action in the form of security training sessions whose aim was to re-sensitize employees to the need for strict adherence to security procedures.

In the other region, the Service had documented five security breaches: one unauthorized contact, one conflict of interest situation and three involving unauthorized disclosures. In four of the cases the Committee agreed with the measures CSIS took to mitigate possible impacts from the breaches and found that the administrative measures the Service took in relation to the employees concerned were appropriate. The fifth case remains under review by the Committee.

B. Investigations of Complaints

In addition to its review function, the Committee has the responsibility to investigate complaints from the public about CSIS. Where appropriate, complaints are investigated through a quasi-judicial hearing presided over by a Member of the Committee. After the hearings are complete, the presiding Member issues a report including any findings and recommendations, to both the Solicitor General and the Director of CSIS. After any information with national security implications is removed, the complainant also is advised in writing of the findings.

Through its investigations of complaints, the Committee assures itself that the Service's activities have been carried out in accordance with the CSIS Act, ministerial direction and CSIS policy. If we find that the Service has acted appropriately, we convey that assurance to the complainant. If the Committee identifies issues of concern, we include these in our report to the Director of CSIS and the Solicitor General and, to the extent possible, report on these matters in our annual report.

Presented below are summaries of reports on investigations issued by the Committee during the past year. Not included here are complaints that were either misdirected, or handled through administrative review or deemed to be outside the Committee's jurisdiction (see Table 1). The summaries are edited to protect the privacy of complainants and to prevent disclosure of classified information.

Four kinds of complaints may be directed to the Committee's attention for investigation:

• complaints lodged by persons “with respect to any act or thing done by the Service”;
• complaints received concerning denials of security clearances to government employees and contractors;
• referrals from the Canadian Human Rights Commission of complaints made to it; and
• Minister's reports in respect of the Citizenship Act.

Reports of Decisions - Case Histories

The Committee reported decisions on five complaint cases during the period under review: four were complaints lodged in accordance with section 41-“any act or thing”-and one was a complaint under section 42 respecting a denial of security clearance. There were no reports on complaints referred from the Canadian Human Rights Commission or on Minister's reports.

Section 41 -“Any Act or Thing”

Case #1: Allegations of Undue Delay in Conducting a Security Screening Investigation

The complaint centred on two allegations. First, that the time (32 months) required by the Service to complete a security screening investigation of the complainant's application for permanent residency in Canada was unreasonable. In support of this allegation, the complainant produced documentation obtained from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) that incorrectly described the Service's role in the process. Second, that statements made by the complainant during a security screening interview with CSIS employees were not correctly reported to officials at CIC who were responsible for deciding on the application.

Based on the evidence gathered during its investigation, the Committee concluded that certain administrative elements in the conduct of the Service's investigation were unsatisfactory and did in fact contribute to an unreasonable delay. It was the Committee's opinion that the accuracy of the Service's reporting to CIC about its interview with the complainant could be cast into doubt due to the absence of a tape-recorded interview. Finally, the Committee agreed that the CIC documentation had misinformed the complainant as to the Service's role in the immigration screening process.

Four recommendations were made by the Committee with the aim of addressing these issues. Three are classified for reasons of privacy or national security. In one recommendation, the Committee reiterated advice offered to the Service on two previous occasions, namely, that CSIS record all immigration security screening interviews and that the recordings be retained until the applicant's immigration status has been finally determined.

Case #2: Allegations of Unreasonable Delay in a Security Screening Investigation

The complainant believed that the length of time required by the Service to complete its security screening investigation connected with an application for permanent residency was unreasonable. The complainant asserted that CSIS was lax in its duties and had failed to communicate adequately with either CIC or the complainant in the matter of the investigation. After reviewing the available evidence, the Committee concluded that the Service had acted appropriately and that the allegations were unfounded. The Committee made one recommendation to the Service relating to the need for certain improvements in the efficiency of handling immigration security screening requests. In response, the Service indicated that it had begun implementing these improvements by the time the report was completed.

Case #3: Allegations that CSIS Provided Adverse and Inaccurate Information to Foreign Authorities

The complainant asserted that CSIS had provided adverse and inaccurate information to the authorities of a foreign country, thus causing the complainant to be briefly detained by those authorities. The complainant further asserted that the transmission of information was not a reasonable exercise of the Service's authority. Upon considering the evidence reviewed during its investigation and presented orally, the Committee concluded that the Service had acted appropriately and within the authorities granted to it by the CSIS Act.

Case #4: Allegations that CSIS Failed to Investigate Threats to the Security of Canada

This complaint contained seven main allegations, all turning on the assertion that CSIS had failed in its duty to investigate threats to the security of Canada and advise the Government on those threats. The Committee conducted a preliminary review of the complaint and of the documentation provided by the complainant. The Committee found that three allegations related to matters best addressed by law enforcement authorities; two others concerned administrative decisions largely under the purview of federal agencies that are not within SIRC's mandate; and the last two raised issues already examined and reported on by the Committee in earlier reports. In view of these findings, the Committee dismissed the complaint in its entirety under section 41( 1)( b) of the CSIS Act, which directs the Committee to investigate only if it is “satisfied that the complaint is not trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith.”

Section 42 - Denial of Security Clearance

Case #1: Revocation of a Security Clearance

The complainant was a Federal Government employee whose security clearance was revoked. As a consequence, the complainant's employment was terminated. The complainant contested the revocation of the security clearance via an appeal to the Committee under section 42 of the CSIS Act. On the basis of a review of relevant documentation and after hearing witnesses' testimony, the Committee concluded that the decision of the federal agency in question to revoke the security clearance was well founded. As required by Government Security Policy, the agency demonstrated that it had reasonable grounds to doubt the loyalty and reliability of the complainant. The Committee recommended that the decision of the responsible Deputy Head to revoke the clearance be upheld.

C. Section 54 Report to the Solicitor General Respecting Allegations of CSIS Misconduct

Under section 54 of the CSIS Act, the Review Committee may “on request by the Minister or at any other time” forward to the Solicitor General of Canada a special report on any matter that relates to “the performance of its duties and functions.” This mechanism is employed infrequently; seven section 54 reports have been issued in the last 10 years. In 2002-2003, the Committee issued one such report to the Minister.

The report addressed alleged incidents involving the Service, which were originally brought to the attention of the Committee during the examination of a section 41 complaint. The allegations were sufficiently serious that the Committee elected to investigate the matter further. After completing our review of all relevant materials and hearing oral evidence, the Committee concluded that the original allegations were without foundation. Furthermore, the Committee saw evidence that the individual making the allegations had acted inappropriately. The Committee made several recommendations to the Service with respect to certain internal administrative and information management procedures.

Section 2: CSIS Accountability Mechanisms

A. Policy and Governance Framework

2002-2003 National Requirements for Security Intelligence

National Requirements contain general direction from government as to where CSIS should focus its investigative efforts, as well as guidance on the Service's collection, analysis and advisory responsibilities. Because the 2001-2002 National Requirements were issued before the events of September 11, 2001, this year's requirements document is the first to address directly the post-September 11 environment.

Overall, the 2002-2003 requirements reflect the impact that new pressures and heightened public awareness have had on intelligence priorities. Although the 2002-2003 requirements are generally consistent with the direction given in previous years, several items drew the Committee's attention:

• CSIS was directed to co-operate with other departments of government so as to facilitate the prosecution or deportation of key members of terrorist organizations and to deny terrorist organizations a safe haven in Canada.
• Measures to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were identified as a more urgent priority since September 11, 2001.
• Considerable attention is given in the 2002-2003 National Requirements to the Service's role in security screening, especially in relation to preventing persons of security concern from entering the country.
• The Service was directed to upgrade, expand or replace technical equipment and information systems, as required, to ensure national security.

Ministerial Direction

Under section 6( 2) of the CSIS Act, the Minister can issue directions governing CSIS's activities and investigations. No new directions were issued in the year under review.

Governor in Council Regulations and Appointments

As set out in section 8( 4) of the CSIS Act, the Governor in Council may issue any regulations to the Service in regard to the powers and duties of the Director of CSIS, as well as the conduct and discipline of Service employees. No such regulations were issued during 2002-2003.

Section 28 Regulations

Under section 28 of the CSIS Act, the Governor in Council may issue regulations governing how CSIS applies to the Federal Court for warrants. In 2002-2003, no such regulations were issued.

Changes in CSIS Operational Policy

Together with the CSIS Act and ministerial direction, CSIS operational policy provides parameters and guidelines for the Service's activities and investigations. The Committee examined 8 new operational policies issued by the Service in 2002-2003 and 44 amendments to existing CSIS policies.

Although there were twice as many new policies this year than last, the most recent additions related essentially to two key areas of Service operations: co-operating with domestic government departments and agencies, and reporting operational information. One new policy provided direction on the Service's disclosure of national security-related information to Canada Customs and Revenue Agency for enforcement purposes. A second policy set out procedures for Service support to CIC in the screening of refugee claimants and foreign nationals.

Six other new policies set out the parameters and procedures for reporting, recording and tracking operational information collected by the Service for use by its employees in conducting investigations.

With respect to the 44 amended policies, almost half were the result of the Counter Intelligence and Counter Terrorism branches being reorganized to create a third branch, Counter Proliferation (see CP banch description page 35). Three revisions were made to reflect changes in Government Security Policy and two others related to the handling of human sources.

Thirteen updates were made to certain procedures and powers in the conduct of investigations and the balance reflected changes necessary to bring policies into conformity with the March 2001 compendium of ministerial direction.

Because of national security concerns, the Committee is unable to elaborate further on these additions to Service policy. We have examined them in detail, however, and we are satisfied that both the new and revised policies conform to the CSIS Act and ministerial direction.

B. Reporting Requirements

Certificate of the Inspector General for 2002

The Inspector General of CSIS reports to the Solicitor General and functions in effect as the Minister's internal auditor of CSIS, reviewing the operational activities of the Service and monitoring compliance with policy and the CSIS Act. Each year, the Inspector General (IG) must submit to the Minister a certificate stating the “extent to which [he or she] is satisfied” with the Director's Annual Report to the Solicitor General on the operational activities of the Service, and informing the Minister of any instances of CSIS failing to comply with the Act or ministerial direction, or which involved an unreasonable or unnecessary exercise of powers. As per section 33( 3) of the Act, the Minister forwards the certificate to SIRC for its consideration.

In reviewing the Inspector General's certificate, SIRC noted that the IG followed a methodology consistent with the previous year. His review consisted of the inspection of documentation supporting the Director's report to the Minister, an analysis of significant Service operations, and interviews with senior CSIS management at HQ and in the field. He based his conclusions on a validation process that included an inspection of CSIS internal documents and a review of the “facting” documentation, supplemented by the IG's annual program of review activities, which this year included inter alia a review of samples of warrants and targets and a detailed examination of certain CSIS investigations.

In this year's certificate, the Inspector General stated that over the 18 years since CSIS was created the “Service has demonstrated a steadily improving organizational maturity and professionalism as a security intelligence service.” With respect to the Director's Annual Report for 2001-2002, he declared himself to be “fully satisfied.” It was his opinion that the Service had not acted beyond the framework of its statutory authority, contravened any ministerial direction or exercised its power unreasonably or unnecessarily.

The Inspector General also commented on CSIS's response to the events of September 11, 2001 and Sunni Islamic extremism. He felt that the Service had positioned itself well to respond to the Sunni Islamic threat and showed considerable flexibility and skill in reallocating resources to address the new, unprecedented threat environment. In his view, the response to the terrorist attacks was measured, properly situated within the Service's statutory framework and very effective. He attributed this in significant measure to the Service's excellent relationships with police forces in major urban centres across the country.

CSIS Annual Operational Report for 2001-2002

In accordance with section 33( 1) of the CSIS Act, the Director of CSIS is required to submit an annual report to the Solicitor General detailing the operational activities of the Service. Further, under section 33( 3) of the Act, the Minister must provide SIRC with a copy of the Director's report, which, pursuant to section 38, SIRC is then required to review.

The Director's report describes the investigations and operational activities of the Service and identifies significant achievements or challenges in its operations. This year represents the Committee's second opportunity to review the abbreviated reporting structure recommended by the Inspector General of CSIS and adopted by the Service in November 2000. Additional detail in support of the report to the Minister is made available in extensive supplementary documentation.

The report outlines the Service investigations conducted during the fiscal year 2001-2002, including individual reporting on each of the Service's branches. It also covers the first full year of operational activity under the new compendium of ministerial direction, effective March 1, 2001, and commented on by SIRC in its 2000-2001 Annual Report. The additional program and activity details provided in this year's report are an improvement over last year's document, and yearly comparisons of CSIS activities and descriptions of new programs will allow the Committee to select topics for future research and be aware of growing pressures on CSIS to meet its obligations.

The Director's 2001-2002 report speaks to specific challenges arising from international events and identifies the CSIS operational activities and programs that are beginning to gain from the new funds approved in the December 2001 federal budget. The Committee will continue to closely monitor both areas.

Unlawful Conduct

Under section 20( 2) of the CSIS Act, the Director of CSIS is to submit a report to the Minister when, in his opinion, a CSIS employee may have acted unlawfully in performing his or her duties and functions. The Minister, in turn, must send the report with his comments to the Attorney General of Canada and to the Committee.

In 2002-2003, the Service sent no reports of illegal activity to the Minister. An instance of unlawful conduct originally reported in the Committee's 2000-2001 Annual Report is still being considered by the Attorney General of Canada.

Section 2(d) Investigations

According to ministerial direction, any investigation of threats to the security of Canada as defined in section 2( d) of the CSIS Act-often referred to as the “subversion” clause-must be authorized by the Minister. The Service reported that the Minister authorized no such investigations in 2002-2003.

Disclosures of Information in the Public or National Interest

Section 19 of the CSIS Act prohibits information obtained by the Service in the course of its investigations from being disclosed except in specific circumstances. Under Section 19( 2)( d) the Minister can authorize the Service to disclose information in the “public interest.” The Service reported no such disclosures in 2002-2003.

In addition, CSIS, acting as the Minister's agent, can disclose information in the “national interest” under specified circumstances. The Service reported that there were no such disclosures during the year under review.

C. CSIS Operational Activities

In addition to carrying out in-depth reviews of selected CSIS operations each year, the Committee requests written and oral briefings from the Service about several activities that are relevant to the Committee's mandate. The information we receive relates to the Service's plans and priorities, especially as they pertain to its main operational branches. Although this information is not independently verified unless it forms part of an in-depth Committee review, it nonetheless helps the Committee to stay apprised of and to monitor the Service's priorities and perspectives, from year to year.

This section of the Annual Report summarizes information the Committee received in written and oral briefings. It also provides data obtained from the Service in accordance with section 38(a)(vii) of the CSIS Act, which requires the Committee to compile and analyze statistics on the operational activities of the Service.

Counter Proliferation

In a significant restructuring of its operational programs, CSIS created in July 2002 a new branch devoted to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The goals of the Counter Proliferation (CP) branch, the Service reported, are to identify countries developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and gather information about these activities so as to advise the Government on possible threats to Canada's national security and public safety.

Among CP's most important concerns is the potential threat posed by terrorist organizations that might manage to obtain the information and materials necessary to use such weapons themselves. According to the Service, the CP branch integrates programs, personnel and resources previously located in the Counter Terrorism and Counter Intelligence branches. The reorganization is intended to better focus existing technical skills and investigative resources.

Given that CSIS is refocusing its operations to counteract the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and in light of the importance that CSIS has given to this organizational restructuring, the Committee sought and received a detailed classified briefing from the Service about its scope and intent. Our in-depth reviews will encompass this new operational branch and we will report our findings in future annual reports.

Counter Terrorism

The role of the Counter Terrorism (CT) branch is to advise the Government on emerging threats of serious violence that could affect the safety and security of Canadians and of Canada's allies. Whether of domestic or foreign origin, addressing the threat of violence in support of political, religious or ideological objectives continues to be one of the Service's chief priorities.

The Service reported a significant reorganization of CT branch's structure in 2002-2003. Several operational units were transferred to the newly created Counter Proliferation branch. Other areas were restructured to improve effectiveness and to handle added responsibilities arising out of new and revised legislation-most notably the Anti-terrorism Act.

As in 2001-2002, the threats presented by Sunni Islamic terrorism remained a major focus of CT's operational activities. According to the Service, the interdiction and removal of suspected terrorists continued to be a key objective. Investigations aimed at preventing terrorists from using Canada as a venue for financing operations have also grown in importance and complexity.

In this Annual Report, the Committee has examined Service investigations of Sunni Islamic extremism as viewed through two studies. Future Annual Reports will present results of other reviews of counter-terrorism investigations carried out by the Service.

Threat Assessments

CSIS provides threat assessments to departments and agencies within the Federal Government based on relevant and timely intelligence. CSIS prepares these assessments—dealing with special events, threats to diplomatic establishments in Canada and other situations—either upon request or unsolicited.

The CSIS unit responsible for preparing threat assessments was moved from CT branch to the newly created CP branch part way through the period under review. Between them, CT and CP branches issued 659 threat assessments in 2002-2003. This number was smaller than the year previous but still an increase over 2000-2001.

As in the past, the Committee continues to examine those threat assessments that are relevant to its in-depth reviews of CSIS operational activities.

Counter Intelligence

The Counter Intelligence (CI) branch investigates threats to national security caused by the hostile intelligence activities of foreign governments, as well as threats to Canada's social, political and economic infrastructure. The Service reported that since the threat environment had altered little since the previous year, the operational and investigative focus of the CI program remained essentially unchanged.

There was some organizational restructuring to reflect changes brought about by the new Security of Information Act and to foster greater administrative streamlining generally. In addition, CI's program on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was made part of the new CP branch.

As in previous years, the Service's counter intelligence activities continue to form part of the Committee's review of Service operations.

Research, Analysis and Production

The Service's Research, Analysis and Production (RAP) branch is responsible for producing and disseminating finished intelligence product to the Government of Canada on threats to the security of Canada through such documents as CSIS Reports, CSIS Studies and CSIS Intelligence Briefs. When appropriate, RAP intelligence product is also distributed to a broader readership.

Authorized disclosures of information obtained in the performance of CSIS's duties and functions-subject to section 19( 2)( a) through (d) of the CSIS Act-are another means by which RAP disseminates intelligence product. RAP reported that in 2002-2003 there were 1335 section 19 disclosure reports, an increase over the 778 reports in 2001-2002.

In 2002-2003, RAP also produced 61 classified reports compared to 83 the previous year. RAP's intelligence publications generally fall under two categories:

• Public safety reports examine the threat to Canadians at home and abroad from international terrorism.
• National security reports address activities in Canada of other governments' intelligence services, as well as global issues such as counter proliferation and transnational criminal activity.

Through RAP, CSIS also contributes to the wider government intelligence community by participating in the Intelligence Assessment Committee (IAC). This body is made up of senior officials from departments and agencies of the Government of Canada most concerned with intelligence matters. In the year under review, RAP staff wrote or contributed to the writing of 13 IAC reports.

The Committee uses RAP reports, studies and briefs to obtain context for the Service's investigations, to identify the Service's perspective on specific threats, and to enhance its own knowledge of the nature of the analysis and advice, which CSIS provides to government pursuant to section 12 of the CSIS Act.

Security Screening

The Service has the authority, under section 13( 1) of the CSIS Act, to provide security assessments to federal government departments. The Service may also, with appropriate Ministerial approval, enter into arrangements to provide assessments to provincial government departments or provincial police forces, as outlined in section 13( 2). Arrangements for providing security screening advice to foreign governments, foreign agencies and international institutions and organizations are authorized under section 13( 3).

For federal employment, CSIS security assessments serve as the basis for determining whether an individual should be granted access to classified information or assets. In immigration cases, Service assessments can be instrumental in CIC's decision to admit an individual into the country and in granting either permanent resident status or citizenship.

CSIS reported to the Committee that it had significantly expanded its security screening program-performed on a cost-recovery basis-for non-federal agencies. These new clients include several provincial governments and operators of nuclear power facilities. CSIS also reported that an increasing proportion of its security screening cases were being processed electronically, permitting greater efficiency in the delivery of security screening services to a growing list of clients.

Another event that impacted the Branch in 2002-2003 was the coming into force in June 2002 of the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which superceded the Immigration Act. The new Act governs the policies and operations of CIC, the Service's largest security screening client.

Immigration Security Screening Programs

Under the authority of sections 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act, the Service conducts security screening investigations and provides advice to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). Generally speaking, the Service's assistance takes the form of information-sharing on matters concerning threats to the security of Canada as defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act and the form of “assessments” with respect to the inadmissibility classes of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Immigration requests for security screening resulted in 445 briefs from CSIS to CIC—242 information briefs and 203 inadmissible briefs. Of those requests, the median time required for a “no reportable trace” (NRT) was 57 days, for an information brief 400 days and for an inadmissible brief 461 days. For the year previous, the median figures were 55 days, 401 days and 498 days, respectively.

Unlike previous years, the Service reported on citizenship applications as a separate category. An information brief with respect to a citizenship application took a median time of 129 days.

During fiscal year 2002-2003, the Service provided 87 update letters (updates to briefs) and 22 incidental letters to CIC.

Applications for Permanent Residence from Within Canada

The Service has the sole responsibility for screening immigrants and refugees who apply for permanent residence status from within Canada. In 2002-2003 the Service received 33,837 such screening requests. Of these requests, 21,950 were immigration applications and 11,887 came through the Refugee Determination Program.

According to the statistical information provided by the Service, the time required for the Service to issue a recommendation on an immigration application varies considerably depending on how the application was filed. Those applications filed using the Electronic Data Exchange from within Canada took a median of 45 days, and electronic filings within the Refugee Determination Program took 55 days. For those applications filed on paper, the median turnaround time for immigration applications from within Canada was 70 days; for applications from the U. S. it was 150 days, and for paper applications from within the Refugee Determination program 94 days.

Application for Permanent Residence from Outside Canada

Immigration and refugee applications for permanent residence that originate outside Canada or the United States are managed by the Overseas Immigrant Screening Program under which the Service shares responsibility for security screening with CIC officials based abroad. Generally, CSIS only becomes involved in the screening process either upon being requested to do so by the Immigration Program Manager or upon receiving adverse information about a case from established sources. CSIS reports that this division of labour allows the Service to concentrate on higher-risk cases.

In 2002-2003, the Service received 23,691 requests to screen refugee and immigration applications initiated outside Canada. Of these, CSIS reported that 6776 were referred to Security Liaison Officers (SLOs) for consultation, marginally fewer than the year previous.

Citizenship Applications and the Watch List

As part of the citizenship application process, the Service receives electronic trace requests from CIC's Case Processing Centre in Sydney, N. S. The names of the citizenship applicants are cross-checked against the names in the Security Screening Information System database. The Service maintains a Watch List that contains the names of individuals who have come to the attention of CSIS through, inter alia, Target Approval and Review Committee-approved investigations.

In 2002-2003, the Service reviewed 158,675 citizenship applications for CIC. Of these, 185 resulted in information briefs. The Service reported issuing no inadmissible briefs. In six instances CSIS reported seeking Ministerial approval to defer its advice.

Front-End Screening

The Front-End Screening (FES) program was implemented by the Government to identify and filter potential security and criminal cases from the refugee claimant stream as early as possible in the determination process. For fiscal year 2002-2003— the first full year in which the program was active—the Service reported receiving 27,407 cases from CIC for processing. Of these, 21,735 were completed by March 31, 2003.

CSIS advised the Committee that administrative difficulties in the transfer of information from CIC that created delays at the startup of the program had since been rectified. The Committee is reviewing the Service's participation in the FES program and will report its findings in a future annual report.

Screening on Behalf of Foreign Agencies

The Service may enter into reciprocal arrangements with foreign agencies to provide security checks on Canadians and other individuals who have resided in Canada. For 2002-2003, the Service reported that 1797 screening checks were carried out on behalf of foreign agencies. Of these, 177 resulted in field investigations.

In a clarification of information provided previously to the Committee and presented in last year's Annual Report, the Service advised the Committee that it does not make recommendations to foreign agencies to deny security clearances. The Service only provides the results of findings, either as a NRT report or a report of adverse information in the form of an information brief.

Security Screening for Federal Employees

2002-2003 Key Statistics

• The Service received 51,262 requests for security screening assessments for clearance, levels one through three, new, upgraded and updated. Also, 870 requests were for action relating to administrative procedures such as downgrades and transfers.
• The Committee asked CSIS to report the median turnaround time for security assessments in two separate categories-Department of National Defence (DND), and all other government departments and agencies. For the period 2002-2003, the Committee noted that the turnaround time for DND assessments, as compared with other government departments, has been considerably reduced from the previous year (Table 2).
• The Service informed us that it conducted 3578 field investigations in order to complete the security screening requests from all government departments and agencies.
• The Service received 34,010 requests for assessments under the Airport Restricted Access Area Clearance Program (ARAACP). This number represents a marginal increase over the previous fiscal year. At 15 days, the median turn around time for ARAACP requests was unchanged from the previous year.
• There were 13,613 requests for security assessments related to “site access,” with requests coming primarily from Ontario Power Generation, Bruce Power, Atomic Energy of Canada and the National Capital Commission.
• The Service reported that their security screening investigations resulted in 26 information briefs and 3 denial briefs.
• CSIS processes certain categories of security screening site access requests with the RCMP acting as intermediary on behalf of the original requester. In 2002-2003, the Security Accreditation Program processed approximately 1450 requests for the Parliamentary Precinct (which includes all facilities, offices and buildings controlled by the Parliament of Canada) and some 13,500 requests for accreditation to other special events and functions to which access is controlled.
• The Service reported that more than 82 percent of screening requests from government clients were processed through the EDE program. The Service also informed the Committee about already implemented and proposed expansions of the EDE program in its SLO posts abroad.

CSIS Domestic and International Arrangements

Relations with the RCMP

Among the Service's domestic liaison partners, the Committee has always paid particular attention to CSIS's arrangements with the RCMP. Again this year, the Service reported that its relationship with the RCMP was undergoing considerable change-a process driven by the increased awareness by government of the need to protect public safety and national security, and by significant new legislation enacted since the events of September 11, 2001.

For the year under review, the Service recorded 2270 written exchanges (originating from either direction) with the RCMP, compared to 1503 in 2001-2002. The Service sent 221 disclosure letters to the RCMP (of which 91 related to the Air India disaster) and 6 advisory letters.

The Service noted that the most important change in its operational liaison with the RCMP was in the manner in which the two organizations exchange personnel. Following a 2001-2002 pilot program carried out in a particular region allowing for mutual secondments of officers, the Service reported that similar arrangements had been fully implemented in three regions of the country. Structured around the RCMP's INSET (Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams) program, the goal of the secondment arrangements is to foster closer operational co-operation between CSIS and the RCMP so that “each party can better respond to common requirements in the area of national security.”

The Service reported that although it was generally pleased with how these new regionally based coordinating bodies had developed, working arrangements and protocols were still being refined. In the Service's view, the INSET program was not sufficiently far along in its implementation to measure successes or identify particular concerns. The Service's participation in the INSET program will be part of a future Committee review of the Service's domestic co-operative relationships.

The Service also reported that, besides on-going exchanges of personnel, CSIS officers contributed to several RCMP training programs and for the first time participated in a key RCMP operational planning session.

Of major importance for the CSIS-RCMP relationship, from the Service's point of view, was the Anti-terrorism Act enacted in late in 2001. Criminalizing a range of activities specifically related to terrorism put an added premium on closer co-operation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies and, according to CSIS, was directly responsible for the increase in flow of operational exchanges between the two organizations.

Other Domestic Arrangements

In carrying out its mandate CSIS co-operates both with police forces and with federal and provincial departments and agencies across Canada. Contingent on Ministerial approval, the Service may conclude written co-operation arrangements with domestic agencies pursuant to section 17( 1) of the CSIS Act.

In the year under review, the Service finalized one new letter of agreement, in this case with a provincial body.

Foreign Arrangements

Pursuant to section 17( 1)( b) of the CSIS Act, the Service must obtain the approval of the Solicitor General—after consulting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs—to enter into an arrangement with the government of a foreign state or international organization. During the initial phases leading to the approval of an arrangement, CSIS is not permitted to pass classified information to the foreign agency; it may, however, accept unsolicited information.

The Service reported that during fiscal year 2002-2003 it had received the Minister's approval to establish 5 new liaison arrangements and to modify arrangements with 21 others. The Service continued to maintain restrictions on exchanges of information with five agencies due to concerns either about the agencies' human rights records, violations of the rule against transferring information to third parties or their overall reliability.

The Service also reported that of the 237 established foreign arrangements, 42 were regarded as dormant (dormancy is defined as no liaison contact for at least one year). Requests for 7 proposed new arrangements have been submitted by CSIS to the Solicitor General and are still under consideration. The Committee continues to monitor the Service's foreign arrangements and will convey our findings in a future annual report.

As part of its foreign liaison program, the Service maintains liaison posts abroad normally co-located with Canadian diplomatic missions. CSIS opened three new posts during 2002-2003 and is expected to open another during fiscal year 2003-2004. The Service reported that the most significant challenge to the foreign liaison program, as in recent past years, was that its overseas posts continue to face an ever-increasing security screening workload arising from its program of assistance to CIC. As in previous years, the Committee will conduct a review of a specific liaison post and report its findings in due course.

Federal Court Warrants and Warrant Statistics

Warrants are one of the most powerful and intrusive tools in the hands of any department or agency of the Government of Canada. For this reason alone their use bears continued scrutiny-a task that the Committee takes very seriously. In the course of our in-depth reviews of CSIS investigations, warrants are generally the subject of detailed examination. In the past, the Committee has also focused solely on warrants as an individual study.

Each year, the Committee asks CSIS to provide statistics about CSIS warrant applications and on warrant powers granted by the Federal Court. Table 3 compares the number of warrant powers issued in each of the last three fiscal years.

According to the Service, the Federal Court issued 25 urgent warrant powers during 2002-2003 compared to 49 in the previous year. Although no applications for warrants were denied by the Court, CSIS reported six instances where the presiding Federal Court Judge requested significant amendments prior to issuing the warrant.

Two new conditions were imposed by the Court, both to be included in all future warrants where relevant. One condition related to obtaining financial records, whereas the second pertained to how persons subject to warrant powers are identified. As a general rule, conditions in a warrant serve to restrict how CSIS may exercise its warrant powers or what it may do with the information collected during its execution.

Finally, CSIS implemented four revisions to existing warrant powers-two were case specific, whereas the other two have become standard in all future warrants. Among the latter, one ensured consistency with new legislation and the other expanded the legal definition of a certain technical device.

The Service reported that in 2002-2003 there were no judicial decisions with significant impact on any individual warrant power or on the warrant process generally.

Warrant Statistics in Perspective

Although the data collected by the Committee provide insight into how often the Service seeks warrant powers from the Federal Court in a given year, comparing these numbers between years is of limited use. A range of factors, as disparate as court decisions and new developments in technology, introduce significant variations into how often warrant powers are applied for and how they are implemented. In addition, a single warrant can authorize the use of several warrant powers against one person, several people or an organization. Considered in isolation, therefore, warrant numbers are not a definitive indicator of the level of Service investigative activity. It is also important to bear in mind that warrants are only one of several investigative instruments available to CSIS.

Section 3: Inside the Security Intelligence Review Committee

Appointment of a New Member

In February 2003, the Governor in Council appointed the Honourable Baljit S. Chadha as a Member of the Committee for a five-year term. Mr. Chadha is the President of Montreal-based Balcorp Limited and a member of the Board of Governors of Concordia University.

Senior Staff Appointments at SIRC

In October 2002, Susan Pollak, Executive Director of SIRC, announced the appointment of Kelly McGee as the Deputy Executive Director. Most recently, Ms. McGee was the Research Manager for SIRC following many years as Senior Counsel and Director of Policy and Legislative Services at the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton.

In March 2003, Suzanne Beaubien joined SIRC as Research Manager. Previously, Ms. Beaubien was the Senior Policy Analyst in the Public Health Branch of the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, with 21 years' experience in communications and program analysis within the Ontario public service. A seasoned journalist, she was the Queen's Park correspondent for the CKO All News national network.

SIRC Staffing and Organization

As of March 31, 2003 the Committee had a staff complement of 16: an Executive Director, a Deputy Executive Director, a Senior Counsel, a Counsel, a Senior Paralegal and an Access to Information and Privacy Officer/ Analyst (both of whom are Committee registrars for hearings), a Research Manager, two Senior Research Advisors, one Senior Research Analyst, two Research Analysts, a Financial/ Office Manager, and an administrative support staff of three to handle sensitive and highly classified material using special security procedures.

At their meetings, Members of the Committee decide formally on the research and other activities they wish to pursue and set priorities for the staff. Management of the day-to-day operations is delegated to the Executive Director with direction, when necessary, from the Committee Chair in her role as Chief Executive Officer.

Research and Review Activities

Each fiscal year the Committee identifies a number of areas of CSIS activity that will be the focus of its review. Reporting regularly to senior management and to Committee Members at their meetings, SIRC researchers and analysts divide their time between SIRC's premises and the Committee's facilities at the Service. The separate office space and computers made available by the Service at CSIS Headquarters are for the exclusive use of SIRC staff.

Security Intelligence Briefings

As part of their regular meetings the Chair and Committee Members have exchanges with senior government officials within Canada's security intelligence community, academics and other experts in the field, or with key non-governmental organizations in order to keep lines of communication open and to stay abreast of new developments. Committee meetings are frequently held in different regions of the country, at which time Members also visit CSIS regional offices to be briefed on local operational priorities and challenges.

Parliamentary Relations

On February 18, 2003, Committee Chair Paule Gauthier and Members Gary Filmon and Raymond Speaker appeared before the House of Commons Sub-Committee on National Security. Also present were SIRC's Executive Director, Deputy Executive Director and Senior Counsel.

Additional Committee Activities

In May 2002, the Committee Chair Paule Gauthier, Member Raymond Speaker and the Executive Director attended a gathering of international intelligence review agencies in London, England.

In June 2002, research staff attended the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies' (CCISS) inaugural conference held at Carleton University, Ottawa. The theme of the Conference was “Canada's Foreign Intelligence Requirements: Threats, Capabilities and Options.” In July 2002, Susan Pollak, SIRC Executive Director, accepted an invitation to join CCISS's Council of Advisors.

In September 2002, the Executive Director and staff attended the conference of the Canadian Association of Security and Intelligence Studies held in Ottawa. The conference theme was: “The New Intelligence Order: Knowledge for Security and International Relations.”

In October 2002, SIRC's Executive Director addressed a graduate seminar at the Centre for Security and Defence Studies, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, in Ottawa.

In February 2003, SIRC senior management and research staff attended the conference of the Law Commission of Canada with the theme “In Search of Security: An International Conference on Policing and Security” held in Montreal.

In March 2003, senior management and staff attended the 2003 CCISS conference in Ottawa entitled: “Intelligence Analysis: Recent Trends, Canadian Requirements.” SIRC's Executive Director participated in the conference's summing up round table.

Budget and Expenditures

The Committee continues to manage its activities within allotted resource levels. The chief expenses were for staff salaries and benefits and for travel expenses within Canada for Committee hearings, briefings and review activities (Table 4).

SIRC Request for Increased Funding

In the Committee's annual report of 2001-2002 we reported on the substantial new resources the Government had allocated to CSIS, namely, an immediate increase in budget of 30 percent. We noted that as a direct and immediate result of this increase, the Service was dramatically raising the level of investigative activities that SIRC has a legal responsibility to monitor and review.

SIRC then undertook a comprehensive review of its own activities and the resources available to fulfill its obligations to Parliament and the people of Canada. As a result, in July 2002 the Committee made a formal request to Treasury Board for an increase in resources of 16 percent. If granted, this would provide the Committee with additional financial resources commensurate with CSIS's expanded level of activities.

Inquiries Under the Access to Information and Privacy Acts

Every year, SIRC receives requests for the release of material under both the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. Table 5 records the number of requests for the past three fiscal years.

Because the Committee receives numerous requests for the same SIRC study the work required to process the first request for any given study does not have to be repeated. The Committee has chosen, therefore, to waive application fees for access to studies.

Appendices

Appendix A: Acronyms

ARAACP

Airport Restricted Area Access Clearance Program

CCISS

Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies

CCRA

Canada Customs and Revenue Agency

CI

Counter Intelligence branch

CIC

Citizenship and Immigration Canada

CP

Counter Proliferation branch

CSE

Communications Security Establishment

CSIS

Canadian Security Intelligence Service

CT

Counter Terrorism branch

DND

Department of National Defence

FES

Front-End Screening program

HQ

CSIS Headquarters, Ottawa

IAC

Intelligence Assessment Committee

IG

Inspector General

INSET

Integrated National Security Enforcement Team

MOU

Memorandum of Understanding

NRT

“no reportable trace”

RAP

Research, Analysis and Production branch

RCMP

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

SIRC

Security Intelligence Review Committee

SLO

Security Liaison Officer

Appendix B : SIRC Reports and Studies Since 1984

(Section 54 reports-special reports the Committee makes to the Minister-are indicated with an *)

1. Eighteen Months After Separation: An Assessment of CSIS Approach to Staffing Training and Related Issues (SECRET) * (86/ 87-01)
2. Report on a Review of Security Screening for Applicants and Employees of the Federal Public Service (SECRET) * (86/ 87-02)
3. The Security and Intelligence Network in the Government of Canada: A Description (SECRET) * (86/ 87-03)
4. Ottawa Airport Security Alert (SECRET) * (86/ 87-05)
5. Report to the Solicitor General of Canada Concerning CSIS' Performance of its Functions (SECRET) * (87/ 88-01)
6. Closing the Gaps: Official Languages and Staff Relations in the CSIS (UNCLASSIFIED)* (86/ 87-04)
7. Counter-Subversion: SIRC Staff Report (SECRET) (87/ 88-02)
8. SIRC Report on Immigration Screening (SECRET) * (87/ 88-03)
9. Report to the Solicitor General of Canada on CSIS' Use of Its Investigative Powers with Respect to the Labour Movement (PUBLIC VERSION) * (87/ 88-04)
10. The Intelligence Assessment Branch: A SIRC Review of the Production Process (SECRET)* (88/ 89-01)
11. SIRC Review of the Counter-Terrorism Program in the CSIS (TOP SECRET) * (88/ 89-02)
12. Report to the Solicitor General of Canada on Protecting Scientific and Technological Assets in Canada: The Role of CSIS (SECRET) * (89/ 90-02)
13. SIRC Report on CSIS Activities Regarding the Canadian Peace Movement (SECRET) * (89/ 90-03)
14. A Review of CSIS Policy and Practices Relating to Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information (SECRET) (89/ 90-04)
15. Report to the Solicitor General of Canada on Citizenship/ Third Party Information (SECRET) * (89/ 90-05)
16. Amending the CSIS Act: Proposals for the Special Committee of the House of Commons (UNCLASSIFIED) (89/ 90-06)
17. SIRC Report on the Innu Interview and the Native Extremism Investigation (SECRET) * (89/ 90-07)
18. Supplement to the Committee's Report on Immigration Screening of January 18, 1988 (SECRET) * (89/ 90-01)
19. A Review of the Counter-Intelligence Program in the CSIS (TOP SECRET) * (89/ 90-08)
20. Domestic Exchanges of Information (SECRET) * (90/ 91-03)
21. Section 2(d) Targets-A SIRC Study of the Counter-Subversion Branch Residue (SECRET) (90/ 91-06)
22. Regional Studies (six studies relating to one region) (TOP SECRET) (90/ 91-04)
23. Study of CSIS' Policy Branch (CONFIDENTIAL) (90/ 91-09)
24. Investigations, Source Tasking and Information Reporting on 2( b) Targets (TOP SECRET) (90/ 91-05)
25. Release of Information to Foreign Agencies (TOP SECRET) * (90/ 91-02)
26. CSIS Activities Regarding Native Canadians-A SIRC Review (SECRET) * (90/ 91-07)
27. Security Investigations on University Campuses (TOP SECRET) * (90/ 91-01)
28. Report on Multiple Targeting (SECRET) (90/ 91-08)
29. Review of the Investigation of Bull, Space Research Corporation and Iraq (SECRET) (91/ 92-01)
30. Report on Al Mashat's Immigration to Canada (SECRET) * (91/ 92-02)
31. East Bloc Investigations (TOP SECRET) (91/ 92-08)
32. Review of CSIS Activities Regarding Sensitive Institutions (TOP SECRET) (91/ 92-10)
33. CSIS and the Association for New Canadians (SECRET) (91/ 92-03)
34. Exchange of Information and Intelligence between CSIS & CSE, Section 40 (TOP SECRET) * (91/ 92-04)
35. Victor Ostrovsky (TOP SECRET) (91/ 92-05)
36. Report on Two Iraqis-Ministerial Certificate Case (SECRET) (91/ 92-06)
37. Threat Assessments, Section 40 Study (SECRET) * (91/ 92-07)
38. The Attack on the Iranian Embassy in Ottawa (TOP SECRET) * (92/ 93-01)
39. “STUDYNT” The Second CSIS Internal Security Case (TOP SECRET) (91/ 92-15)
40. Domestic Terrorism Targets-A SIRC Review (TOP SECRET) * (90/ 91-13)
41. CSIS Activities with respect to Citizenship Security Screening (SECRET) (91/ 92-12)
42. The Audit of Section 16 Investigations (TOP SECRET) (91/ 92-18)
43. CSIS Activities during the Gulf War: Community Interviews (SECRET) (90/ 91-12)
44. Review of CSIS Investigation of a Latin American Illegal (TOP SECRET) * (90/ 91-10)
45. CSIS Activities in regard to the Destruction of Air India Flight 182 on June 23, 1985-A SIRC Review (TOP SECRET) * (91/ 92-14)
46. Prairie Region-Report on Targeting Authorizations (Chapter 1) (TOP SECRET) * (90/ 91-11)
47. The Assault on Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi (SECRET) (92/ 93-07)
48. Domestic Exchanges of Information (A SIRC Review-1991/ 92) (SECRET) (91/ 92-16)
49. Prairie Region Audit (TOP SECRET) (90/ 91-11)
50. Sheik Rahman's Alleged Visit to Ottawa (SECRET) (CT 93-06)
51. Regional Audit (TOP SECRET)
52. A SIRC Review of CSIS' SLO Posts (London & Paris) (SECRET) (91/ 92-11)
53. The Asian Homeland Conflict (SECRET) (CT 93-03)
54. Intelligence-Source Confidentiality (TOP SECRET) (CI 93-03)
55. Domestic Investigations (1) (SECRET) (CT 93-02)
56. Domestic Investigations (2) (TOP SECRET) (CT 93-04)
57. Middle East Movements (SECRET) (CT 93-01)
58. A Review of CSIS SLO Posts (1992-93) (SECRET) (CT 93-05)
59. Review of Traditional CI Threats (TOP SECRET) (CI 93-01)
60. Protecting Science, Technology and Economic Interests (SECRET) (CI 93-04)
61. Domestic Exchanges of Information (SECRET) (CI 93-05)
62. Foreign Intelligence Service for Canada (SECRET) (CI 93-06)
63. The Audit of Section 16 Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Reports (TOP SECRET) (CI 93-11)
64. Sources in Government (TOP SECRET) (CI 93-09)
65. Regional Audit (TOP SECRET) (CI 93-02)
66. The Proliferation Threat (SECRET) (CT 93-07)
67. The Heritage Front Affair. Report to the Solicitor General of Canada (SECRET) * (CT 94-02)
68. A Review of CSIS' SLO Posts (1993-94) (SECRET) (CT 93-09)
69. Domestic Exchanges of Information (A SIRC Review 1993-94) (SECRET) (CI 93-08)
70. The Proliferation Threat-Case Examination (SECRET) (CT 94-04)
71. Community Interviews (SECRET) (CT 93-11)
72. An Ongoing Counter-Intelligence Investigation (TOP SECRET) * (CI 93-07)
73. Potential for Political Violence in a Region (SECRET) (CT 93-10)
74. A SIRC Review of CSIS SLO Posts (1994-95) (SECRET) (CT 95-01)
75. Regional Audit (TOP SECRET) (CI 93-10)
76. Terrorism and a Foreign Government (TOP SECRET) (CT 94-03)
77. Visit of Boutros Boutros-Ghali to Canada (SECRET) (CI 94-04)
78. Review of Certain Foreign Intelligence Services (TOP SECRET) (CI 94-02)
79. The Audit of Section 16 Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Reports (TOP SECRET) (CI 94-01)
80. Domestic Exchanges of Information (A SIRC Review 1994-95) (SECRET) (CI 94-03)
81. Alleged Interference in a Trial (SECRET) (CT 95-04)
82. CSIS and a “Walk-In” (TOP SECRET) (CI 95-04)
83. A Review of a CSIS Investigation Relating to a Foreign State (TOP SECRET) (CI 95-02)
84. The Audit of Section 16 Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Reports (TOP SECRET) (CI 95-05)
85. Regional Audit (TOP SECRET) (CT 95-02)
86. A Review of Investigations of Emerging Threats (TOP SECRET) (CI 95-03)
87. Domestic Exchanges of Information (SECRET) (CI 95-01)
88. Homeland Conflict (TOP SECRET) (CT 96-01)
89. Regional Audit (TOP SECRET) (CI 96-01)
90. The Management of Human Sources (TOP SECRET) (CI 96-03)
91. Economic Espionage I (SECRET) (CI 96-02)
92. Economic Espionage II (TOP SECRET) (CI 96-02)
93. Audit of Section 16 Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Reports 1996-97 (TOP SECRET) (CI 96-04)
94. Urban Political Violence (SECRET) (SIRC 1997-01)
95. Domestic Exchanges of Information (1996-97) (SECRET) (SIRC 1997-02)
96. Foreign Conflict-Part I (SECRET) (SIRC 1997-03)
97. Regional Audit (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1997-04)
98. CSIS Liaison with Foreign Agencies (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1997-05)
99. Spy Case (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1998-02)
100. Domestic Investigations (3) (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1998-03)
101. CSIS Cooperation with the RCMP-Part I (SECRET) * (SIRC 1998-04)
102. Source Review (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1998-05)
103. Interagency Cooperation Case (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1998-06)
104. A Case of Historical Interest (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1998-08)
105. CSIS Role in Immigration Security Screening (SECRET) (CT 95-06)
106. Foreign Conflict-Part II (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1997-03)
107. Review of Transnational Crime (SECRET) (SIRC 1998-01)
108. CSIS Cooperation with the RCMP-Part II (SECRET) * (SIRC 1998-04)
109. Audit of Section 16 Investigations & Foreign Intelligence 1997-98 (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1998-07)
110. Review of Intelligence Production (SECRET) (SIRC 1998-09)
111. Regional Audit (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1998-10)
112. CSIS Liaison with Foreign Agencies (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1998-11)
113. Allegations by a Former CSIS Employee (TOP SECRET) * (SIRC 1998-12)
114. CSIS Investigations on University Campuses (SECRET) (SIRC 1998-14)
115. Review of Foreign Intelligence Activities in Canada (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1998-15)
116. Files (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1998-16)
117. Audit of Section 16 Investigations & Foreign Intelligence (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1999-01)
118. A Long-Running Counter Intelligence Investigation (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1999-02)
119. Domestic Exchanges of Information (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1999-03)
120. Proliferation (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1999-04)
121. SIRC's Comments on the Draft Legislation Currently Before Parliament-Bill C-31 (PROTECTED) * (SIRC 1999-05)
122. Domestic Targets (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1999-06)
123. Terrorist Fundraising (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1999-07)
124. Regional Audit (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1999-08)
125. Foreign State Activities (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1999-09)
126. Project Sidewinder (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1999-10)
127. Security Breach (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 1999-11)
128. Domestic Exchanges of Information 1999-2000 (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2000-01)
129. Audit of Section 16 Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Reports 1999-2000 (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2000-02)
130. CSIS Liaison with Foreign Agencies (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2000-03)
131. Regional Audit (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2000-04)
132. Warrant Review (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2000-05)
133. Review of CSIS Briefs to Citizenship and Immigration Canada 1999-2000 (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2001-02)
134. CSIS Investigation of Sunni Islamic Extremism (TOP SECRET)(SIRC 2002-01)
135. Source Recruitment (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2001-01)
136. Collection of Foreign Intelligence (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2001-05)
137. Domestic Extremism (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2001-03)
138. CSIS Liaison with Foreign Agencies: Audit of an SLO Post (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2001-04)
139. Warrant Review (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2001-06)
140. Special Report following allegations pertaining to an individual (TOP SECRET) *
141. Audit of Section 16 and Foreign Intelligence Reports (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2002-02)
142. Review of the Ahmed Ressam Investigation (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2002-03)
143. Lawful Advocacy, Protest and Dissent Versus Serious Violence Associated with the Anti-Globalization Movement (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2002-04)
144. Regional Audit (TOP SECRET) (SIRC 2002-05)
145. Special Report (2002-2003) following allegations pertaining to an individual (TOP SECRET) *

Appendix C: Key Findings and Recommendations

In the Matter of Ahamed Ressam

On December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested while attempting to enter the United States from Canada with explosives hidden in the trunk of his rental car. Ressam was subsequently convicted on charges related to his unsuccessful attempt to carry out a terrorist attack at the Los Angeles International Airport to mark the beginning of the new millennium.

Upon reviewing all the relevant documentation, the Committee concluded that the Service did not possess specific information that would have forewarned it of Ressam's planned terrorist operations. In the Committee's view, the actions CSIS took to locate Ressam in 1999 were appropriate in light of the information available at the time. The Committee saw no evidence that it was a lack of vigilance on the part of the Service that contributed to Ressam's ability to escape detection after his return in 1999 to Canada.

The Committee found that the Service's investigative activities following Ressam's arrest were appropriate and proportionate to the threat. The Service complied with the requirements of law, ministerial direction and policy.

This case showed the capacity of the Service and the RCMP to assist each other effectively while working within their respective mandates. Similarly, the exchanges of information between the Service and its U.S. partners were timely and comprehensive, indicating a smooth-functioning and productive relationship.

Sunni Islamic Extremism - A Review of CSIS Regional Investigations

The Committee examined all electronic and hard-copy documentation during the review period related to five broad operational activities:

1. the targeting request and approval process, and the investigating of targets;
2. the acquiring and implementing of warrants;
3. the recruiting, developing and directing of human sources;
4. the conducting of interviews in the community; and
5. the exchanging of information and other forms of liaison with domestic agencies.

Targeting and Investigations

The Committee found that in all cases the Service had reasonable grounds to suspect the target's involvement in activities that constituted a threat to the security of Canada and that the levels of investigation were proportionate to the threat activities observed.

In obtaining targeting authorities and conducting the investigations, the Service met all the requirements set out in law, ministerial direction and operational policy. It collected only the information strictly necessary for the investigation.

Two instances drew the Committee's attention and required additional inquiries of the Service. In the first, the Committee reviewed documentation about an unusual event involving one of the selected targets. The Committee was satisfied that no improper conduct on the part of CSIS contributed to the event, nor did any Service employee contravene operational policy.

The second instance related to an error on the part of the Service that had been rectified by CSIS as soon as it was noticed. Unusual and extenuating circumstances contributed to the error and the Committee is satisfied that it was unintentional. Further, the Committee was able to confirm that the Service took the proper administrative and operational measures to correct the error as soon as it became evident.

Warrant Acquisition and Implementation

With respect to all the warrants examined in both regions and based on the information made available to the Committee for review, we found that CSIS conducted the warrant acquisition process in a thorough and objective manner and used supporting information appropriately. Affidavits were complete and balanced, and the facts and circumstances of the cases were fully, fairly and objectively expressed.

The Committee also found that in executing the warrant powers obtained, CSIS exercised its powers appropriately and complied with all warrant clauses and conditions. With minor exceptions, both regions strictly observed operational policies concerning the collection and retention of information obtained under the warrants.

Recruitment and Direction of Human Sources

In all cases the Committee found that the Service had acted appropriately and within the law and had properly followed all policies and procedures relating to the recruiting and directing of human sources. In one especially sensitive area of the Service's use of human sources-one that has drawn the Committee's attention previously-the Committee found that CSIS managed the relationship with the source appropriately. The Committee did identify some minor errors and oversights in one Region's human source record keeping.

Interviews in the Community

The Committee's review of relevant CSIS documentation showed that it conducted its interviews in the community in a fair and appropriate manner and with sensitivity to the interviewees' civil liberties and religious freedoms. In all the interviews reviewed, CSIS was careful to make interviewees aware that it was investigating threats posed by Sunni Islamic extremism, not investigating the Sunni community as a whole.

Liaison and Exchanges of Information with Domestic Agencies

The Committee's examination showed that all exchanges of information, disclosures by the Service and joint operations were conducted in accordance with law and policy. The Service's efforts in both Regions to build strong and co-operative relationships with other agencies were evident to the Committee. In the months following the September 11 attacks, the benefit of these initiatives was especially important because available resources to investigate threats were stretched thin.

Issues of Internal Security

In one region, the Committee identified a number of security violations and no breaches. In the other region, the Service had documented five security breaches: one unauthorized contact, one conflict of interest situation and three involving unauthorized disclosures. In four of the cases the Committee agreed with the measures CSIS took to mitigate possible impacts from the breaches and found that the administrative measures the Service took in relation to the employees concerned were appropriate. The fifth case remains under review by the Committee.

Domestic Threats in Conjunction with Lawful Advocacy, Protest and Dissent

The Committee found that overall, CSIS conducted this complex set of investigations in an appropriate, lawful and professional manner, taking considerable care in implementing policy measures designed to prevent intrusion into legitimate political activity. The Committee believes, based on its investigation, that the Service took seriously its obligation to weigh the requirement to protect civil liberties against the need to investigate threats to national security.

The Committee identified a number of issues that gave rise to several recommendations.

1. In the case of two individual targets where it was clear that threat activities had abated, the Committee believes CSIS should have terminated its investigations earlier than it did. In addition to the general policy guidance, CSIS officers responsible for the investigation received explicit direction from management to end the investigations if no threat activities were reported.
   To avoid such occurrences in the future, the Committee recommended that:
   CSIS maintain a strict awareness of operational policy and executive directive requiring the timely termination of targeting authorities in the absence of targets' threat-related activity.
2. In executing valid warrant powers against an individual target, CSIS reported extensively on a non-targeted individual and collected information on that person's threat-related activities without seeking a separate targeting authority. In the Committee's view, the Service should have sought a separate targeting authority rather than rely on another investigation to collect the information it did.
   Accordingly, based on this case the Committee recommended that:
   In its collection of information through the execution of warrant powers, CSIS avoid extensive reporting on non-targeted individuals, and be vigilant in seeking targeting authority once an individual's threat-related activities become evident.
3. The Committee identified several administrative oversights and delays in the Service's handling of a human source file. None had any material impact on the course of the investigation or the information collected. Nevertheless, based on this case the Committee recommended that in future:
   CSIS pay strict attention to operational policy requirements regarding the administrative handling of human source files.
4. The Committee found evidence of some friction in exchanges with domestic agencies. This clearly presented challenges but did not, in the Committee's view, materially impact upon the Service's effectiveness in conducting its investigations.
   Accordingly, the Committee has recommended to the Service that:
   It examine whether the negotiation of co-operative agreements between CSIS and its domestic partners would be of benefit and enhance their relationships.

Collection of Foreign Intelligence

The Committee concluded that in implementing ministerial requests for assistance under section 16, CSIS complied with all legal and administrative requirements.

The review identified no irregularities or other concerns regarding the authorizations for, and the management of, the collection of information under Federal Court warrants. All requests for supplementary information that CSIS sought from CSE were appropriate and in compliance with law and policy. The Committee saw no information about Canadians collected in the course of section 16 operations that had been inappropriately retained in Service files.

Review of Foreign Arrangements

The Committee's review found that the establishment of the new arrangements and the expansion of the existing ones was carried out in compliance with the CSIS Act, ministerial direction and the Solicitor General's conditions for approval. The Committee took special care to examine information relevant to the human rights records of the agencies' host countries, including open-source reporting from reputable international human rights agencies.

In this regard, the Committee took note of several new relationships where the Service will need to exercise vigilance to ensure that no information received from an agency is the product of human rights violations, and that no intelligence transferred to an agency results in such abuses.